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THE UNPUBLISHED, NON-PRECEDENTIAL
DECISION: AN UNCOMFORTABLE LEGALITY?
Melissa H. Weresh*
In August 2000, the Eighth Circuit ruled in Anastasoff v.
United States2 that its rule prohibiting the use of unpublished
decisions as precedent represents an impermissible expansion of
the judicial power emanating from Article III of the United
States Constitution.3 This decision was ultimately vacated as
moot by the Eighth Circuit en banc, but the issue concerning the
validity of rules regarding unpublished decisions remains a
viable one. Criticism regarding unpublished decisions and their
use as precedent has been widespread since the rules evolved
* Assistant Director of Legal Writing, Drake University Law School. The author
would like to thank Thomas E. Baker, James Madison Chair in Constitutional Law and
Director, Constitutional Law Center, Drake University School of Law for his generous
support and encouragement on this project.
2. 223 F.3d 898, vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
3. 223 F.3d at 898.
4. 235 F.3d at 1056. In Anastasoff, a taxpayer claimed she was due a refund of
overpaid federal tax. 223 F.3d at 899. The government argued that the claim was not
timely, basing this position on an unpublished decision of the Eighth Circuit, Christie v.
United States, No. 91-2375MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992). Anastasoff, 235 F.3d at 1055. A
three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit concluded that Eighth Circuit rule restricting the use
of unpublished decisions was unconstitutional and therefore the court was bound by
Christie. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 905. Prior to the en banc review, the government refunded
the taxpayer's claim. Anastasoff, 235 F.3d at 1055. Also, while the case was before the
three-judge panel, the Second Circuit decided Weisbart v. United States, 222 F.3d 93
(2000), a decision which was in direct conflict with Christie. The three-judge panel had
considered itself without the proper authority to adopt Weisbart, thereby overruling
Christie, a decision which would only be proper for the en banc panel to make. Anastasoff,
235 F.3d at 1055. Finally, prior to the en banc hearing, the Internal Revenue Service issued
an Action on Decision announcing the acquiescence of the government in the rule of
Weisbart regarding the timeliness of taxpayer filings. Id. Consequently, at the en banc
hearing the court concluded that the case was moot because the claim had been refunded to
the taxpayer and the government's position no longer rested on an unpublished decision.
Id. The court noted, "The controversy over the status of unpublished opinions is, to be
sure, of great interest and importance, but this sort of factor will not save a case from
becoming moot. We sit to decide cases, not issues .... " Id. at 1056.
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approximately twenty years ago.' In this essay, the author traces
the initial problem which gave rise to the limited
publication/restricted citation rules, the variety of rules in place
today at the circuit level, and the various criticisms of and
justifications for the rules. The author then examines the original
Anastasoff opinion, which declared such citation restrictions
unconstitutional, and particularly the specific legal basis cited by
the Anastasoff court. The author then proposes alternate legal
theories that may address the legality of rules restricting the
citation of unpublished decisions. The author concludes that the
rules are certainly offensive to a perception of fairness and raise
serious questions under Article III, the equal protection and due
process clauses, and the statutory right to appellate review.
Consequently, the legality of the rules merits consideration by
the United States Supreme Court.
I. THE PROBLEM
The original problem the unpublished decision rule was
designed to address was the volume crisis in the federal
appellate courts. 6 The 1990 Federal Court Study Committee
began its discussion of the problems facing appellate courts with
the following remark: "However people may view other aspects
of the federal judiciary, few deny that its appellate courts are in
'crisis of volume' . . . ."' While the federal district courts have
experienced significant increases in volume,8 the concerns
regarding volume have centered on the appellate courts because
the rate of increase at the appellate level is higher and "there is a
5. See generally Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished
Opinions: Do the Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the Means
of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 235 (1998); Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of
Appeals Perish If They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and
Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat? 44 Am. U. L Rev. 757 (1995); William
L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 1167 (1978).
6. See generally Thomas E. Baker, Rationing Justice on Appeal: The Problems of the
U.S. Courts of Appeals 31-32 (West 1994).
7. Id. at 31 (citing Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 109 (Apr. 2, 1990)).
8. George M. Weaver, The Precedential Value of Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 39
Mercer L. Rev. 477, 477 (1998) (noting that plaintiffs filed 188,487 cases in the district
courts in 1980 and, by 1985, that number had increased to 299,164).
THE UNPUBLISHED, NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION
general consensus that increased demand is more difficult to
accommodate at the appellate level .. . ."9 Between 1960 and
1994, filings in the courts of appeals had "soared 1139%." '0
Parties involved in federal litigation have a statutory right of
appellate review." While all do not avail themselves of that
right, statistics demonstrate that the ratio of appellants has
increased over time. 12
The increased volume in the appellate courts has a number
of negative impacts. First, the workload has significantly
increased the time it takes to proceed with a federal appeal.'3
Second, the increased number of appellate decisions arguably
increases the time necessary to thoroughly research and write
appellate briefs and appellate opinions.' 4 Third, proponents of
limited publication argue that the sheer number of appellate
decisions may ultimately result in confusion of the issues."
9. Christopher F. Carlton, The Grinding Wheel of Justice Needs Some Grease:
Designing the Federal Courts of the Twenty-First Century, 6 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Policy 1, 1
(1997).
10. Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal
Courts, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 11, 25.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
12. Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 177,
183 (1999) (noting that, "in 1945, only one out of forty district court cases were appealed"
as opposed to one in eight in 1988).
13. See Baker, supra n. 6, at 43-50.
14. See Reynolds & Richman, supra n. 5, at 1168-69. The authors cite a 1915
commentator who, in response to increasing numbers of published decisions, complained:
The law library of the future staggers the imagination as one thinks of the
multitudes of shelves which will stretch away into the dim distance .... One
shrinks from the contemplation of the intellectual giants who will be competent
to keep track of the authorities and make briefs in those days; they, as well as the
judges who pass upon the briefs, must needs be supermen indeed.
Id. at 1169 (quoting John B. Winslow, The Courts and the Papermills, 10 III. L. Rev. 157,
158 (1915)). See also Kirt Shuldberg, Student Author, Digital Influence. Technology and
Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 541, 546 (1997).
Shuldberg acknowledges one judge's description of the situation almost thirty years ago:
[N]oting the limited capacity of judges and lawyers to research and assimilate
the mass of judicial opinions, [the judge] commented that "[t]hose limits are
dangerously near at present and in some systems may already be exceeded," and
that "[c]ommon law in the United States could be crushed by its own weight if
present trends continue unabated."
Id. (quoting Charles W. Joiner, Limiting Publication of Judicial Opinions, 56 Judicature
195, 195-96 (1972)).
15. See Martin, supra n. 12, at 177. Martin quotes Justice McReynolds from sixty years
ago: "'In my view, multiplied judicial utterances have become a menace to orderly
administration of the law. Much would be gained if three-fourths (maybe nine-tenths) of
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Finally, one judge has argued that the increase has had a
negative impact on the quality of work considered by the courts,
commenting that "too high a percentage of litigants are
appealing .... The stream of cases coming onto our docket,
therefore, has become larger and more diluted in merit."
II. THE SOLUTION
In 1964, the Judicial Conference authorized the appellate
courts to issue opinions not designated for publication.'
7
Publication of opinions was authorized only when the opinion
was of "general precedential value.""' In 1971, the Federal
Judicial Center suggested that unpublished opinions not be
cited.'9 The circuit courts were asked to develop rules regarding
the publication of opinions. ° By 1974, there were a variety of
different practices regarding publication of opinions and the
citation of those designated not for publication.2 At that time the
Conference characterized the situation as one of "11 legal
laboratories accumulating experience" and determined that "the
possible rewards of such experimentation [were] so rich" that
the system should be allowed to continue without interference.22
Generally, the circuits have issued rules circumscribing the
publication of opinions based on two assumptions: (1) that
certain opinions "serve no lawmaking function"23 and (2) that
[the opinions] published in the last twenty years were utterly destroyed. Thousands of
barren dissertations have brought confusion, and often contempt."' Id. (quoting Thatch v.
Livingston, 56 P.2d 549, 549-50 (Cal. Dist. App. 2d Dist. Div. 2 1936)).
16. Id. at 183.
17. Baker, supra n. 6, at 127.
18. Id.
19. See Reynolds & Richman, supra n. 5, at 1169-70.
20. Id. at 1170.
21. Id. at 1171-72.
22. id. at 1172 n. 29.
23. Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and
Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 940, 941-
42 (1989). The author notes that "appellate opinions serve two primary functions: first, to
resolve particular disputes between litigants" and "second, to advance the state of the law
in some manner." Id. at 941. Selective publication plans assume that decisions which do
not serve the latter purpose should not be published. Id. However, "appellate opinions
serve a host of other purposes: to supervise the lower courts, for instance, or to provide a
mechanism for interested or disinterested observers to keep track of how an agency is
administering a statute." Id. at 941-42. She notes that the policies underlying limited
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publishing decisions "is costly in a number of ways. 24 A
decision with precedential effect, warranting publication,
generally does one or more of the following:25
* establishes a new rule of law;
* alters, modifies, clarifies or explains an existing rule of
law;
* contains a reasoned criticism or questioning of existing
law;
* resolves or identifies an apparent conflict of authority,
either within the circuit or between the circuit and another,
or creates a conflict between the circuit and another;
* draws attention to a rule of law that appears to have been
generally overlooked;
* applies an existing rule of law in a novel factual context,
differing materially from those in previously published
opinions of the court applying the rule;
publication plans fail to "consider the plans' impact on these purposes." Id. at 942.
Commentators have acknowledged that the rules regarding limited publication are based on
three premises: First, some opinions do not serve the lawmaking function and therefore do
not merit publication; second, publication is costly, including the costs of producing and
consuming judicial opinions; and third, appellate judges can effectively determine which
decisions serve only the dispute resolution and not the lawmaking function. See Reynolds
& Richman, supra n. 5, at 1182-85; see also Baker, supra n. 6, at 119-20: "[Tlhe very
writing of an opinion reinforces the decisionmaking and ensures correctness." Baker
concludes, "In the balance of interests involved, the value of self-restraint provided by
writing deserves greater weight than the value of efficiency gained through decision by
edict." Baker, supra n. 6, at 120-21.
24. Robel notes that judges, like other published authors, must spend additional time on
published decisions "to express that resolution felicitously, to shore it up with citations to
authority at every turn, and to anticipate in writing possible criticisms of the opinion."
Robel, supra n. 23, at 942. In addition to the burden of writing borne by the court, the
litigant suffers the cost of delay while the opinion is being written and "everyone suffers
from added costs associated with increasingly large volumes of the Federal Reporter. ... "
Id. Notwithstanding these costs, the author ultimately concludes that the rules that attempt
to curtail use of the unpublished opinion are failing and that advantages enjoyed by
litigants with disproportional access to unpublished decisions are exacerbated by selective
publication plans. Id. at 955-59.
25. See Jerome I. Braun, Eighth Circuit Decision Intensifies Debate over Publication
and Citation of Appellate Decisions, 84 Judicature 90 (2000). Braun constructed a "model
rule" by studying the rules regarding publication and citation of unpublished decisions
found in the twelve territorial circuits and the nine states that have rules on the subject. See
id. at 93.
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* contributes significantly to the legal literature by
reviewing the legislative, judicial, administrative or
electoral history of an existing rule of law;
* interprets a rule of state law in a way conflicting with
state or federal precedent interpreting the state rule;
* is a case of first impression in the court with regard to the
substantial issue it resolves;
* concerns an issue of substantial or continuing public
interest or importance; or
* will otherwise serve as a significant guide to the bench,
bar or future litigants.
Even without such properties, an opinion should be
published if it:
* reverses, modifies, or denies enforcement, on substantive
grounds, of a lower court or administrative agency
decision, or affirms it on a substantive ground different
from those set forth below;
* certifies a question of law to a state supreme court, or
applies the answer;
* is by the court sitting en banc; or
* when the case has been reviewed, and its merits
addressed, by an opinion of the United States Supreme
Court.
2 6
In addition, "[m]ost rules provide that the publication
decision is to be determined by a majority of the deciding
panel.... Some courts provide for partial publication where a
part of the opinion meets the publication standards and the rest
does not.... " "
A corollary to the rules limiting publication is restriction of
citation to unpublished decisions. Restricting citation to
unpublished decisions is necessary because the objectives
underlying limited publication, "reduced cost and increased
judicial efficiency," would be frustrated if citation to
unpublished decisions were permitted.28 "[A] market for these
26. Braun, supra n. 25, at 93.
27. Id.
28. Shuldberg, supra n. 14, at 549.
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opinions [would] develop," and judges would accordingly have
to spend more time on the opinions." Moreover, it is possible
that wealthier litigants would be unfairly advantaged if citation
to unpublished decisions were permitted, as they could more
easily bear the increased costs of research. °
III. THE CRITICISM
There has been an enormous amount of controversy
regarding the practice of issuing unpublished decisions that
cannot be cited as precedent.' The foremost appears to be the
arguable effect the practice has on judicial accountability."32 The
fear is that "[t]yranny [will flourish] when the law is
unwritten .... Written law, on the other hand, allows for a
check of the government and gives the citizens a method to
review the government's application of the law." " Judges may
act arbitrarily or use the practice to avoid publicly issuing the
difficult, complicated or unpopular decision. Providing a
public, written opinion for each decision provides litigants and
29. Id. at 549-50.
30. See Reynolds & Richman, supra n. 5, at 1185-87.
31. See Baker, supra n. 6, at 125-27.
32. See id. at 128-29. Baker notes:
Law, and appellate decisionmaking as a pure form of law, is and always will be
more an art than a science. To understand fully what is being decided and why,
one must know how and why the court's political power is being exercised. The
court should feel obliged to explain itself to the candid reader.
Id. at 129; see also William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and
the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 273,
282-283 (1996). Richman and Reynolds write:
When a judge makes no attempt to provide a satisfactory explanation of the
result, neither the actual litigants nor subsequent readers of an opinion can know
whether the judge paid careful attention to the case and decided the appeal
according to the law or whether the judge relied on impermissible factors ....
Id.
33. Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions:
A Reassessment, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 119, 128 (1994). Martineau concludes, however,
that there are sufficient restrictions on judicial decisionmaking to allay fears of judicial
unaccountability. "American appellate systems... have many built-in protections to
prevent against this irresponsibility without mandatory publication of opinions." Id. at 132.
34. Carpenter, supra n. 5, at 254-56 ("Using an uncitable, unpublished opinion to
dodge sensitive issues or to delay confronting a conflict within the court is possible.
Moreover, uncitable, unpublished opinions may keep questionable decisions out of the
glare of academic and professional review." (footnote omitted)).
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society the power to monitor the development and application of
the law. The electronic availability of unpublished decisions
undermines the assumption that a decision designated not for
publication can be written with less regard for public scrutiny.
"Publication is a signal to litigants and observers that a court has
nothing to hide, that the quality of its work in a case is open for
public inspection." 35 Moreover, "[w]ritten opinions encourage
judges to produce well-reasoned, well-written decisions because
they subject judges' conclusions to public scrutiny. This leads to
better, more consistent opinions because it holds judges
accountable to the public which they serve." 36
It can be argued that these criticisms reflect a cynical
distrust of the judiciary. Moreover, concerns regarding
accountability can be addressed by reference to practical
"constraints" on the exercise of judicial power. 7 As a practical
matter, most judicial decisions are made by a panel of judges
who must come to some form of agreement on the result.38 If one
of the judges chooses to disagree and to issue a dissenting
opinion, under most rules "both the majority and the dissenting
opinions qualify for publication" status. Moreover, judicial
accountability at the appellate level is enhanced by the
possibility of further review by an en banc panel or a higher
court. Further, the experience in the trial court systems, which
operate without a publication requirement, has shown no greater
potential for judicial irresponsibility attributable to lack of
formal, published opinions.
Finally, to the extent that there are serious misgivings
regarding a particular decision, the fact that it is unpublished
does not necessarily mean that the opinion is inaccessible or
unobtainable. Unpublished opinions can be quite lengthy and
well reasoned4' (clearly undermining the primary stated
35. Reynolds & Richman, supra n. 5, at 1190.
36. Carpenter, supra n. 5, at 248.
37. See generally Martineau, supra n. 33, at 129-32.
38. Id. at 129.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 130.
41. Not according to some authors. Richman and Reynolds comment, "It should come
as no surprise that unpublished dispositions are ... dreadful in quality .... The primary
cause lies in the absence of accountability and responsibility .... Moreover, a judge's
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objective of saving time), and they are accessible through means
including Westlaw, LEXIS, the circuit web site, or request to the
clerk of courts.4 ' Thus, the opinions, while not provided to the
traditional reporter services, are not "secret" and are therefore
subject to review by the public.43 It is noteworthy that this
response, that the opinions are available and therefore subject to
review, undermines the very objective of the system and gives
rise to additional criticisms regarding limitations on citation.44
Another criticism of the rules is that they undermine the
appellate process. A litigant is denied the possibility of effective
review by a higher court when the resolution of his or her case
goes unpublished.45 If an opinion has been designated as having
no precedential value, the Supreme Court is less likely to grant
review of an issue that arguably has no impact on future
litigants.46 Moreover, barring the citation of unpublished
opinions makes it difficult to discern an inconsistency between
mastery of the case is reduced when she does not publish." Richman & Reynolds, supra
n. 32, at 284.
42. See generally Robel, supra n. 23.
43. See Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, I J. App. Prac. &
Process 219, 220 (1999). Judge Arnold explains that "unpublished" does not mean
"secret." It simply means that the opinion is not transmitted to a legal publisher; it is
nonetheless available to the public. Id. at 219-20. Carpenter holds a different view:
What else, but a secret, is an unpublished opinion wrapped up in a no-citation
rule? The process itself is a secret, and now the decision, the decisionmakers,
and their reasons are a secret to everyone but the parties. Moreover, if a decision
cannot be concealed within a no-citation rule, then the parties face the danger of
a court simply affirming or reversing, keeping its reasoning safely hidden in the
judicial vault. This does not sound like the customary click and clack of
American courthouse machinery; it sounds more like the clang of a door being
closed.
Carpenter, supra n. 5, at 236.
44. See infra nn. 74-78 and accompanying text.
45. See Richman & Reynolds, supra n. 32, at 283-84. The authors note, first, that lack
of a detailed explanation makes it difficult for a reviewing court to consider an issue and
second, that the Supreme Court is not likely to grant discretionary review to a case that the
lower court thought not worthy of a published opinion. Id.; see also Carpenter, supra n. 5,
at 256. Carpenter explains that the effect of the limited publication/restricted citation rules
is to remove the check on appellate court power inherent in Supreme Court review:
"Selective publication and no-citation rules create a potentially dangerous situation
because 'they tend to leave some of the most powerful persons in the country accountable
(with regard to at least part of their work) to no one-not even to themselves or to each
other."' Id. (citing Reynolds & Richman, supra n. 5, at 1204).
46. See Reynolds & Richman, supra n. 5, at 1202-03.
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panels of the same circuit, or between circuits.47 An unpublished
decision may not effectively set forth the basis for a lower
court's opinion, which therefore undermines effective review by
the higher court.4" Worse, a court can rely on the rationale of
another "unpublished opinion, without disclosing the source of
its reasoning." 4' Finally, "legal consumers," defined as "the
bench, the bar, the scholars, and the public," are less likely to
pay "critical" attention to unpublished decisions, further
undermining the likelihood of Supreme Court attention. °
As a threshold matter, proponents of the limited
publication/restricted citation rules argue that "'hard as it is for
academia to believe, the nonprecedent is really not a
precedent."' 5' The criticism regarding the appellate process fails
to acknowledge that, where a result is contrary to published
authority, the complaining litigant need only bring that fact to
the attention of the reviewing court by "pointing out the
discrepancy" to the higher court." Further, proponents contend,
an unpublished decision likely does not "show a conscious
disregard of the published case law. At most, unpublished
opinions will show lack of awareness of the accepted published
law, but that unawareness is best attributed not to the deciding
courts' schemes but to the failure of counsel to bring it to the
courts' attention."" If a result is contrary to published precedent,
it is likely due to the court's interpretation that the precedent is
"inapplicable to the present case." 
5 4
47. See David Dunn, Student Author, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 128, 140 (1977). The author notes that conflicts may
develop between unreported decisions which could go undetected. Id. Worse, any attempt
to address this dilemma in the form of indexing or categorizing unreported decisions
effectively creates an underground body of law that is within the courts' attention but to
which it should pay no attention. Id.
48. See Reynolds & Richman, supra n. 5, at 1203. The authors note that "less
comprehensive and less thoughtful opinions make it more difficult for the Court to
determine exactly what the lower court has done." Id.
49. Martineau, supra n. 33, at 133.
50. Reynolds & Richman, supra n. 5, at 1203.
51. Martin, supra n. 12, at 181 (quoting Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of
Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 Am. U. L. Rev. 909, 914 (1986)).
52. Martineau, supra n. 33, at 133.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 133-34. "If the assumption is that judges are dishonest, it does not follow that
they are foolish enough not to cover their tracks." /d. at 134.
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Critics of the system also question the ability, and the
authority, of the courts to determine which cases have
precedential value. As a practical matter, the concept of
precedential value is a fluid concept-what may not have
precedential value on a given day may assume great significance
in light of developments in the law. Judges are not capable of
anticipating the facts of future disputes or the effect of a
published decision in an area of law.5 The precedential value of
a case is usually established early in the decision-making56
process. This, critics argue, undermines the process itself
because
an early decision not to publish may affect not only the
form in which the final decision is rendered, but also the
actual reasoning or result....
Limited publication and citation rules require judges to
determine in advance the rule of law that will emerge from
a case, and then to determine the effect of their decisions on
the development of the law. Because our common law
system emphasizes the importance of facts in each case,
judges hardly can hope to predict the facts of future
disputes ... There is no such thing as the "mere application
of a rule, for every case constitutes a needed reaffirmation
and/or extension, at least temporarily, of the rule." 
57
Consequently, the rationale underlying the precedential
value is critically flawed. In fact, the determination that a case
55. Reynolds & Richman, supra n. 5, at 1192. The authors rely on Justice Stevens to
demonstrate that an author of an opinion is "uniquely ill-suited" to make a determination
about the precedential effect of a decision: "[A] rule which authorizes any court to censor
the future citation of its own opinions rests on a false premise. Such a rule assumes that an
author is a reliable judge of the quality and importance of his own work product." Id. n.
128 (quoting the remarks of Justice Stevens to the Illinois State Bar Association's
Centennial Dinner in 1977).
56. Martineau, supra n. 33, at 134; see Robel, supra n. 23, at 954. Robel also reveals
that publication decisions are made routinely on the basis of subject matter and on
recommendation of judicial staff. Robel, supra n. 23, at 953-54. She notes "that judges
rarely disagree with the initial decision to decide an appeal on the briefs" offered by the
litigants. Id. at 954. That decision is largely based on an initial screening by the staff, and
"staff determinations may be guided largely by the subject matter of the opinion." Id. at
953-54.
57. See Martineau, supra n. 33, at 134 (quoting Pamela Foa, Student Author, A Snake
in the Path of the Law: The Seventh Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev .
309, 312 (1977)).
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does not raise a new issue does not necessarily diminish its
importance. There is a "value [in] accumulations of decisions in
an area" for many reasons: One, repeated "affirmations [create]
stability" for attorneys by providing prior precedent, and two,
additional applications of a legal principle help "flesh out a
precedent... .." " Further, a change in the law may not arise as a
result of a new issue, but because the same issue continues to
arise. 9 Since the doctrine of stare decisis is dependent upon
availability of published opinions, the limited publication rules
undermine the development of the common law.6
Proponents of the unpublished opinion contend that judges
are in the best position to make a determination regarding the
future precedential value of a case. As one proponent noted:
"Federal appellate judges are in the best position" to determine
which cases rise to the level of lawmaking and if judges are
trusted sufficiently to decide a case, "[w]hy can't [they] be
trusted enough to then make the ancillary decision whether it
should be published?" 61
Stare decisis and the American common law system have
never required the publication of all decisions. The modern
system has its roots in England, which has never required
publication of all appellate decisions.62 In fact, in England only a
small percentage of the appellate decisions are published, and
the American rules restricting publication are therefore closer to
the English model.63 The idea that, because each case has a
different set of facts, it therefore represents unique precedent,
58. Id. at 136.
59. Reynolds & Richman, supra n. 5, at 1190 (noting "the accumulation of a large
number of routine decisions on a discrete point may suggest to courts, practitioners, or
scholars that problems exist in that area, problems that may require doctrinal reform" ).
60. See Dragich, supra n. 5, at 773, 782 (observing that "[t]he development of the strict
doctrine of stare decisis is tied directly to the availability of reliable case reports, upon
which the doctrine is utterly dependent"). Dragich advises that "the availability of the facts
and analysis of prior cases is vital to the process of applying the law to current cases.
Knowledge of the result alone is not enough to support the process of legal reasoning." Id.
at 782-83 (footnote omitted).
61. Martin, supra n. 12, at 192.
62. Baker, supra n. 6, at 125; see Martineau, supra n. 33, at 136-37.
63. See Martineau, supra n. 33, at 136-37.
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overstates the meaning of precedent64 and obliterates the concept
of stare decisis:
If all cases are different because their facts are different,
there can be no precedent. The doctrine of stare decisis
assumes that some opinions do make law that is valid
beyond the narrow facts of the individual case. Limited
publication and citation rules reflect this assumption and
seek to publish only those opinions that can fairly be said to
make law.65
Since unpublished decisions are not intended to be
accessible, they do not serve the ends of predictability the
doctrine of stare decisis was intended to provide. In fact, "[t]he
use as precedent of an unpublished opinion, to which even the
average man with counsel does not have access, would make the
law capricious and unpredictable." 
66
Another criticism of the limited publication rules is that
they fail to achieve their desired objective of maximizing court
and litigant resources by reducing the time spent writing• • 67
opinions. Studies that have examined whether the limited
publication rules increase judicial productivity have been
inconclusive. 6' Further, because some unpublished decisions are
64. "The theory of precedent depends, for its ideal operation, on the existence of a
comfortable number of precedents, but not too many." Shuldberg, supra n. 14, at 561
(quoting Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 Yale L.J. 1037, 1041
(1961)). Other commentators, however, see no problem in there being ample case law:
The notion that full publication will damage the cohesiveness of law has
intuitive appeal: inability of the bench and bar to deal with 'too much' case law
will result in an amorphous mass leading to confusion and inconsistency .... It
is difficult to understand, however, how merely cumulative opinions threaten the
cohesiveness of the common law; they should, if anything, make research and
discernment of a principle easier, since there will be more cases elaborating a
principle, and some of those cases will be more recent as well.
Reynolds & Richman, supra n. 4, at 1190.
65. Martineau, supra n. 33, at 137.
66. Weaver, supra n. 8, at 485-86 (concluding that unpublished decisions, because of
their lack of "promulgation," should not be considered precedent).
67. Robel, supra n. 23, at 942-43.
68. See e.g. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 581, 593-626 (1981). In another article, Professors Richman and Reynolds report that
they found "scant correlation ... between publication rates and circuit productivity."
Richman & Reynolds, supra n. 32, at 286 n. 64. Moreover, the authors believe that if
judges use unpublished opinions to reach decisions inconsistent with published authority,
the practice could have:
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lengthy and thoroughly reasoned and supported, it is
questionable whether courts are maximizing the potential time
savings in the context of limited publication. Finally, critics
argue that litigants' research would be enhanced by additional
authority that elaborates on a legal principle.6 9
As a related matter, critics of the rule argue that the
accessibility justifications have been undermined by
technological advancements.70 The restrictions on citation were
originally designed to prevent certain litigants, primarily
institutional litigants, from gaining an unfair advantage over
those with less access to unpublished decisions." However, the
unfair advantage exists and the fact that institutional litigants
have access to a vast "shadow body of law" gives them a
decisive advantage.72 Moreover, the no-citation restriction
should force a court to disregard its own opinions, but this does
not always happen. Unpublished decisions are "locked away in
the institutional memories of the courts that produce them,
where they often wield a silent but powerful influence over
future decisions."7 Eliminating the citation restrictions would
force those parties to acknowledge the source of their arguments
perverse caseload consequence .... An attorney might take an appeal that she
otherwise would not take in the hope that the court will recognize the justice of
her client's position and reverse the judgment in an unpublished decision-one
that contains little reasoning and no precedential value.
Id.
69. See Reynolds & Richman, supra n. 5, at 1204:
The notion that full publication will damage the cohesiveness of law has
intuitive appeal: inability of the bench and bar to deal with 'too much' case law
will result in an amorphous mass leading to confusion and inconsistency .... It
is difficult to understand, however, how merely cumulative opinions threaten the
cohesiveness of the common law; they should, if anything, make research and
discernment of a principle easier, since there will be more cases elaborating a
principle, and some of those cases will be more recent as well.
70. See Shuldberg, supra n. 14, at 544 (noting that "limited publication/no citation
plans.., are tied to an older, less powerful and less interactive means of communication,
and ... the applicability of these plans [has changed under the] circumstances of today's
digital world").
71. Robel, supra n. 23, at 955.
72. Carpenter, supra n. 5, at 250; see Robel, supra n. 23, at 955 (noting that "the
limited distribution plans currently operating assure that the people with unusual access to
these opinions will be the same litigants who enjoy a variety of other institutional
advantages in litigation: the frequent litigants").
73. Carpenter, supra n. 5, at 250.
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and allow opposing counsel the opportunity to effectively
respond.
Proponents of the rules argue there is an enormous time
savings in issuing a decision not for publication. 4 They
acknowledge that the opinions are accessible electronically, but
highlight the additional resources expended in reviewing the
additional decisions, both by the bar and the courts.75 Regarding
accessibility and fairness, proponents of the rules reason that the
persuasive value of an unpublished decision to a litigant is
"marginal at best." 76 By definition, the unpublished decision is
not persuasive as it fails to meet general precedential criteria.
"In fact, judicious use of unpublished opinions gives greater
emphasis to those that are published. It separates the diamonds
from the dross .... , Many proponents further believe that the
solution is not to afford unlimited citation access to litigants, but
to further ratchet the rules regarding citation and use of
78
unpublished decisions.
Criticism of the limited publication and citation restriction
rules has been well documented. One critic of the rules is Judge
Richard S. Arnold of the Eighth Circuit who, in 1999, published
an article questioning the practice of issuing unpublished
decisions. 9 In the article, Judge Arnold questioned whether the
rules addressing the precedential value of unpublished opinions
represented a violation of Article III of the United States
Constitution. Judge Arnold noted:
Article III of the Constitution of the United States vests
"judicial power" in the Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. We can exercise no power that is not "judicial."
74. See Martin, supra n. 12, at 189-91. Judge Martin notes that unpublished decisions
are shorter because they need not include "exhaustive discussions of the law" or extensive
recitation of fact. Id. at 190. Also, the unpublished decision is less time consuming because
it need not be as extensively researched. Id.
75. See Martineau, supra n. 33, at 144-45. The author notes that "[wihether done in
books or computer databases, legal research takes time, and time is money. The more
opinions available to research, the more time the research takes, and the greater the cost."
Id. at 145.
76. Id. at 138 (noting that "[w]ithout citation, the unpublished material has no more
persuasive force than if its proponent were its creator").
77. Martin, supra n. 12, at 191.
78. See generally, Martineau, supra n. 33, at 145-148.
79. Arnold, supra n. 43, at 219.
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That is all the power that we have. When a governmental
official, judge or not, acts contrary to what was done on a
previous day, without giving reasons, and perhaps for no
reason other than a change of mind, can the power that is
being exercised properly be called "judicial"? Is it not
more like legislative power, which can be exercised
whenever the legislator thinks best, and without regard to
prior decisions? In other words, is the assertion that
unpublished opinions are not precedent and cannot be cited
a violation of Article III?80
This statement proved to be a precursor to the first decision
challenging the legality of the limited publication/restricted
citation rules, Anastasoff v. United States.8
IV. THE REACTION
In an extraordinary judicial response to the limited
publication/restricted citation rules, a panel of the Eighth Circuit
held in Anastasoff that Article III of the U.S. Constitution
prohibits non-precedential decisions.82 While the decision was
ultimately vacated as moot,83 the opinion sets forth persuasive
judicial reasoning regarding this lingering unresolved question.
Writing for the panel, Judge Arnold reasoned that "[i]nherent in
every judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a
general principle or rule of law." 84 Further, the Framers intended
that the declaration of law inherent in each judicial decision was
authoritative and provided a limitation on the judicial power
delegated to the courts under Article 11.8 Accordingly, the
Eighth Circuit rule which designates unpublished decisions as
non-precedential effectively allows the court to avoid the effect
of its prior decisions and constitutes an impermissible expansion
of Article III power.86
The original Anastasoff opinion was grounded in a review
of the history of precedent and its relationship to the authority of
80. Id. at 226.
81. 223 F.3d 898, vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
82. Id. at 899.
83. Anastasoff, 235 F.3d at 1056.
84. 223 F.3d at 899.
85. Id. at 900 (citing U.S. Const. Art. I1, § 1, cl. I).
86. Id.
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the courts under Article III. Judge Arnold provides an historical
overview of the American doctrine of precedent, noting that,
while "[m]odern legal scholars tend to justify the authority of
precedents on equitable or prudential grounds," 87 the eighteenth
century notion of precedent was "derive[d] from the nature of
the judicial power itself." 18 He continues: "The judicial power to
determine law is a power only to determine what the law is, not
to invent it. Because precedents are the 'best and most
authoritative' guide of what the law is, the judicial power is
limited by them." 89 Arnold reviewed American legal tradition,
quoting Alexander Hamilton to conclude that "'[tlo avoid an
arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they
should be bound down by strict rules and precedent, which serve
to define and point out their duty in every particular case that
comes before them . . . 90 Moreover, "early Americans
demonstrated the authority which they assigned to judicial
decisions by rapidly establishing a [comprehensive reporting
system] in the years following the ratification of the
Constitution." 91
Arnold specifically noted that American legal tradition
does not require the publication of every opinion: "Courts may
decide, for one reason or another, that some of their cases are
not important enough to take up pages in a printed report." 92
Further, Anastasoff s ruling that Article III prohibits a court
from designating a case as non-precedential should not be
construed to create "some rigid doctrine of eternal adherence to
precedents." 93 Arnold acknowledged that some cases can and
should be overruled, but when this occurs, the court bears the
"burden of justification .... In this way, the law grows and
changes, but it does so incrementally, in response to the dictates
of reason, and not because judges have simply changed their
minds." 94
87. Id. at 901 (footnote omitted).
88. Id. (footnote omitted).
89. Id. (citation omitted).
90. Id. at 902 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78 510 (Modem
Library ed., 1938)).
91. Id. at 903 (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 904.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 904-05.
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The Anastasoff opinion is extraordinary insofar as it
suggests that all circuits with rules designating unpublished
decision as non-precedential have engaged in constitutionally
impermissible conduct since the advent of the particular rule.
The decision provides litigants across the country authority to
cite to unpublished decisions, notwithstanding rules to the
contrary. Given Anastasoff s reliance on Article III, the decision
arguably extends to all Article III courts, thereby impacting
district courts and possibly state courts insofar as state court
power based on a state constitution is modeled after the federal
system. As a result, a Supreme Court review of the issues raised
in Anastasoff is critical, particularly because there may be
additional constitutional challenges to the no-citation rules that
the Court should address.
V. THE EVALUATION
Clearly, there are a variety of policy considerations that call
into question the legitimacy of the limited publication/restricted
citation rules. The Anastasoff opinion takes the controversy to a
higher level, because the three-judge panel took the position that
the rules may be invalidated as a matter of constitutional law.
This position was based upon an interpretation of Article III. As
Judge Arnold explained, the effect of the Eighth Circuit rule was
to expand the judicial power to include discretion to limit the
precedential effect of decisions.9  This represents an
impermissible expansion of the Article III judicial power.96 In
addition to concerns regarding an impermissible expansion of
power beyond Article III, allowing courts to refuse to
acknowledge any binding effect of prior decisions raises
concerns under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause and the statutory right to appeal granted by federal
statute.
95. Id. at 905.
96. Id.
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A. Due Process
With regard to due process considerations, the rights
protected under substantive due process are not limited to those
enumerated in the Constitution.97 Rather, the rights are "'those
of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty' the
abridgment of which would violate 'a principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental .... "' 98 Consequently, if stare decisis is
fundamental to the scheme of ordered liberty under the due
process clause, the question becomes whether a limited
publication/restricted citation rule deprives litigants the due
process of law. Removing an entire category of decisions from
consideration certainly appears to do that.
Further, addressing procedural due process
considerations, some authors have suggested that the courts
recognize "freedom from arbitrary adjudicati[on],"9 9 or the
right to "reasoned explanation," ,oo as liberty interests protected
under the Due Process Clause. Moreover, "if due process
requires notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment, the
opportunity to present 'every available defense' must include the
chance to cite unreported decisions." ',' As one court has noted,
"any decision is by definition a precedent, and.., we cannot
deny litigants and the bar the right to urge upon us what we have
previously done." o2
97. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (acknowledging that
the Court has "regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition,' ... and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed"') (citations omitted).
98. See e.g. Dunn, supra n. 47, at 144 (citing Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
99. William Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process
in the Administrative State, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 445, 487 (1977) (asserting that "the ideas of
liberty and of substantive due process may easily accommodate a view that the government
may not adjudicate the claims of individuals by unreliable means").
100. Robert L. Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative
Discretion through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 60, 60 (1976). Professor
Rabin argues that procedural due process requires a hearing and "an accurate decision...
assuring that facts have been correctly established and properly characterized in conformity
with the applicable legal standard." Id. at 76.
101. Dunn, supra n. 47, at 144 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
102. Jones v. Superintendent, 465 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972).
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These issues were raised in Do-Right Auto Sales v. United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,'3 a case that
challenged the constitutionality of the Seventh Circuit restriction
on citation of unpublished opinions.'c4  The petitioners
challenged the rule restricting citation of unpublished decisions
on due process and equal protection grounds,' 5 noting that prior
published decisions were critical to the stability of the law and
predictable enforcement of rules.° 6 In its brief in opposition, the
Seventh Circuit responded:
[T]he doctrine of stare decisis... is a judicially created
policy; it is not enshrined in the Constitution. Courts do
modify and overrule their prior decisions. By definition,
therefore, courts do have authority to determine whether a
given decision has value as a precedent for future cases,
and correspondingly, whether it should be published to the
world. 107
But if "[a] deciding panel participates in a dialogue that is
both backward and forward looking, both inwardly and
outwardly directed, and both upwardly and downwardly
important,"' 0 and an "appellate judgment builds on past
decisions and shapes future decisions,"'O0 is a litigant no longer
entitled to rely on the decisions issued by the appellate court? In
Do-Right, the Supreme Court denied the petitioners' motion for
leave to file a petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition.'HO
The question regarding the constitutionality of no-citation rules
in light of stare decisis and its relationship to the due process
103. 429 U.S. 917 (1976).
104. See Dunn, supra n. 47, at 142-44. The petitioners alleged that the rule restricting
citation of unpublished decisions constituted "an unlawful prior restraint on freedom of
speech, and 'impinge[d] upon the.. .right to petition the government for redress of
grievances' carrying 'serious consequences for the fair and equal administration of
justice."' Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 143.
106. Id. at 143, n. 100.
107. Id. at 143 (citing Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Petitioners' Motion for Leave
to File a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition at 25, Do-Right Auto Sales v. U. S.
Ct. App. Seventh Cir., 429 U.S. 917 (1976)).
108. Baker, supra n. 6, at 121 (citing Thomas E. Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare
Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687, 712-13, 731-34 (1981)).
109. Dunn, supra n. 47, at 142-44.
110. Id. at 143 n. 102 (citing Do-Right Auto Sales v. U. S. Ct. App. 7th Cir., 429 U.S.
917 (1976)).
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clause therefore remains unresolved. Clearly, however,
legitimate due process constitutional issues are presented by the
citation restrictions.
B. Equal Protection
Equal protection considerations are also raised in the
context of the limited publication/restricted citation rules. Under
the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, similarly situated federal litigants must be
treated similarly."' Shortcuts in the decision making process
limit the likelihood of review of an action disposed of by
unpublished decision. Some authors have concluded that courts
are more likely to hear oral argument and issue a published
decision in "important" cases (such as antitrust or securities)
and are more likely to utilize procedural shortcuts to dispose of
"trivial" cases ( such as those involving social security or
prisoner petitions)."2 Professors Richman and Reynolds note
that " [t]he cumulative effect of truncated procedures has a
devastating impact on the rights of those most in need of judicial
protection, those litigants whose claims raise no systemic law-
making concerns, but only the claim that they have been denied
justice at the trial court." '" In effect, the schema that warrants
publication only of cases that serve a law making function, the
I 1. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ("Although it contains no Equal
Protection Clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause prohibits the Federal Government from engaging in discrimination that is 'so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."'); U. S. Dept. Agriculture v. Murry, 413
U.S. 508, 517 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("One aspect of fundamental fairness,
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, is that individuals similarly
situated must receive the same treatment by the Government.").
112. Richman & Reynolds, supra n. 32, at 295; see Robel, supra n. 23, at 947 (arguing
that the limited publication/restricted citation "plans do not operate neutrally with regard to
the subject matter of the opinions, so that most of the work of the courts in several subject
areas appears only in unpublished form"). Robel further cautions:
[F]requent litigants receive the [unpublished] opinions .... [T]he advantages of
this access are exaggerated because unpublished opinions tend to cluster in
subject-matter areas that pit frequent litigants against . . . 'one-shotters'[refers to
litigants and not the types of cases] ... [who file] criminal appeals, social
security cases, and immigration cases ....
Id. at 955.
113. Richman & Reynolds, supra n. 32, at 295.
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"important" cases, further disenfranchises "poor and
powerless" litigants. 14
Additionally, the methods used by the courts "to
discourage use of unpublished decisions ... do not work. In
fact, these methods aggravate and enhance any inherent
unfairness the selective publication plans might have." '
Providing every litigant full appellate review, including the
opportunity for oral argument and a well-reasoned, published
opinion, "assur[es] that the complaints of every litigant-small
or large, rich or poor-are given equal treatment by those most
powerful of governmental figures, the judges of the federal
courts of appeals." 116 The procedural shortcuts in place at the
appellate level threaten "the American judicial system's basic
guarantee of justice to all in equal measure .... Damages
caused by the current breach of that promise are severe and
incalculable." 117
C. Statutory Right to Appeal
Finally, the legality of restrictions on citations of
unpublished decisions may be challenged on a statutory basis. If
every litigant has a statutory right to an appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, restricting reliance on prior decisions which are on point
and decided by the same appellate court arguably undermines
this right.' 8 Noting various procedures employed by the
appellate courts to respond to the volume crisis, including
114. Id. at 296 (warning that "[o]ur judicial system can answer the cynics' charges of a
systematic tilt toward the rich and powerful only if the courts police themselves rigorously
and deliver on their sworn promise of equal justice").
115. Robel, supra n. 23, at 955.
116. Richman & Reynolds, supra n. 32, at 297.
117. Id.
118. The statutory argument may assume constitutional implications if the right to an
appeal is constitutionally mandated, as some authors argue. See Harry G. Fins, Is the Right
of Appeal Protected by the Fourteenth Amendment? 54 Judicature 296, 297 (1971)
(asserting that "'equal protection' . .. requires that once a state establishes avenues of
appellate review, 'these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only
impede open and equal access to the courts . . . .' [Therefore] the right of appeal is ...
protected... by ... the Constitution .. "); John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil
Procedure, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 579, 628-29 (1984); Note, Screening of Cases in the Federal
Courts of Appeals: Practice and Proposals, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 77, 82 (1973) ("Given
popular expectations ... it would be unacceptable, if not unconstitutional, to eliminate the
practice of one appeal as of right." ).
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selective publication, Professors Richman and Reynolds
observe:
Thus, an effective right to appeal error to the circuit courts
no longer exists; instead, litigants must petition the staff to
obtain access to the judges. In short, despite their statutory
and historical role as courts of appeal, the circuit courts
have become certiorari courts.119
Because decisional shortcuts such as limited publication
have the "effect of transforming the courts of appeals into
certiorari courts," 20 the authors conclude:
There is, of course, one significant difference between [the
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.] Congress has
authorized the Supreme Court to act as a certiorari court,
but has required the courts of appeals to hear every
litigant's appeal as a matter of right. Thus, the
transformation of the circuit courts has not only been
unwise, but lawless as well. 
21
Clearly, legitimate concerns regarding due process, equal
protection, judicial power under Article III and the statutory
right to appellate review warrant consideration of the legality of
no-citation rules.
VI. CONCLUSION
The limited citation/restricted citation rules have long been
the subject of serious controversy. There is no question that the
original impetus for the rules, a crisis of volume at the appellate
level, remains a critical concern and has likely worsened in
recent years. The contradictory policy considerations relating to
the rules involve judicial accountability and efficiency, and the
variety of costs to courts, litigants and the bar. Some of the
policies that once supported the rules have changed dramatically
in relation to technological advances. Challenges to the legality
119. Richman & Reynolds, supra n. 32, at 275. The authors explore three primary
methods employed by the appellate courts to respond to the volume crisis, including
limitations on oral argument, reductions in the number and length of published decisions
and increasing reliance on visiting and senior judges and non-judicial support staff. Id. at
278-93.
120. Id. at 293.
121. Id. at 294 (footnote omitted).
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of the rules include the scope of Article III power, due process,
equal protection and the statutory right to appellate review.
There appears to be no clear resolution when weighing the
policy concerns, but clearly the legal implications warrant
judicial review. Additional legal questions, including due
process and equal protection implications as well as the effect of
the rules on the statutory right to appellate review, should also
be considered.
